You use the download parameter to restrict the returned results to volumes that have an availabledownload format of epub by setting the to the valueepub.The following example searches for books with an epub download available:
The accessInfo section is of particular interest in determiningwhat features are available for an eBook. An epub is a flowing textformat ebook, the epub section will have anisAvailable property indicating if this type of ebook is available.It will have a download link if there is a sample for the book or if the usercan read the book either due to having purchased it or due to it being publicdomain in the user's location. A pdf for Google books indicates ascanned pages version of the ebook with similar details such as if it isavailable and a download link. Google recommends epub files foreReaders and SmartPhones, as scanned pages may be hard to read on these devices.If there is no accessInfo section, the volume is not available as aGoogle eBook.
the ultimate question 2.0 epub 40
My answer recommending Pandoc (now deleted, so included inline below) to SO question, User manual for Java software: In-application help + PDF, which also discusses some other useful technologies for dealing with Epub conversion.
It makes use of latexml and ebook-converter (the command line tool that comes with calibre). This works very well with lots of formulas. Once mathML is encoded in newer epub versions things will even get prettier by using latexmlpost -dest=$1.xhtml $1.xmlinstead of the second line of my script.
ConTeXt allows for export to xml (and xhtml). With a small wrapper script, it should be possible to convert the output to epub. For example, consider a simple TeX file that inputs another file and has some math in it:
The aim of this paper is to propose a pluralist framework of fair health distribution that addresses shortcomings in the definitions of health inequity proposed in the past. Our framework consists of two principles: the weak principle of health equality and the principle of fair trade-offs. The weak principle of health equality offers an alternative definition of health inequity. In developing this principle, it is not our intention to review the immensely rich literature on health equity; rather, we defend an alternative view of health equity that is grounded in general theories of justice. The principle of fair trade-offs supplements weak equality in health, and when integrated the two principles represent a comprehensive and more practical understanding of health inequity - what we prefer to call fair health distribution. Trade-off questions require balancing health equity and overall population health as well as balancing concern for health with concern for other goods.
Rejecting strong equality of health, the question then becomes when we can reasonably diverge from strong health equality. Below, we will examine four widely held objections to strong equality of health: (1) the levelling down objection, (2) only those inequalities that are social are unjust, (3) individual responsibility, and (4) the problem of biological or technological limitations. On the basis of the examination of these four objections, we defend the weak principle of health equality as a backbone of our proposed framework of fair health distribution.
"One natural way to understand the goal of equity in health--the goal of health egalitarians--is to say that we should aim, ultimately, to make all people healthy; that is, to help them to function normally over a normal lifespan. Pursuing equality means "levelling up"-- bringing all those in less than full health to the status of the healthy."[35]
Does this distinction between social and natural goods indeed hold, and is it morally relevant and useful? We shall not attempt to review the very interesting debate about the correct interpretation of Rawls' view on this issue, but rather question the factual premise this debate presupposes [36]. In our view, this distinction is irrelevant in thinking about when inequalities in health are unjust.
A common misunderstanding of liberal egalitarianism is that these theories argue that individuals should be held responsible for the consequences of their choice. In the context of health this would imply that all inequalities in health are counted as fair if the agent in question could have avoided bad health outcomes by making different choices. However, the principle of responsibility states that individuals should be held responsible for their choices, not for the consequences of their choices [46, 47]. It is only in the special case where the outcome only depends on the individual's choices and not on any other factors (including the responsibility of society) that this principle implies that individuals should be held responsible for the consequences of their actions. To hold people responsible for the actual consequences of their choice would therefore be to hold them responsible for too much [48]. The implication of the principle of responsibility on the concept of health equality is therefore in practice limited.
The key question is: if strong equality is not feasible, should egalitarians be concerned about strong equality or equal shortfall from what is feasible? In short, should we be concerned about all health inequalities (measured from an equal baseline), or only shortfall inequalities (measured from a baseline defined by what is possible)?
All definitions of health equity proposed in the past have exclusively focused on health inequalities: among many health inequalities, which ones are unfair? The weak principle of health equality is one partial answer to this question. A definition of fair distribution of health needs to expand its scope beyond health inequalities. Even if the weak principle of health equality is satisfied - every person or group has equal health adjusted for technological limitations to further health improvements - there may be situations where fairness in distribution rejects weak health inequality.
Achieving health equality is an important goal but is only the first step towards a broader pluralist notion of fair health distribution. The next step involves trade-offs with other objectives. In the world of limited resources, defined broadly in terms of, for example, money, time, and talents, to tackle serious issues in our society, how important is it for us to commit to the weak principle of health equality? We divide such trade-off issues into two categories, trade-off between weak health equality and overall health, and trade-off between health and other goods. Together we call them trade-off questions, which form another backbone of our proposed framework of fair health distribution.
Weak equality of health is morally objectionable when further improvement in weak equality leads to unacceptable sacrifices of average or overall health of the population. This formulation, of course, leaves open the normative question about which trade-offs between weak equality and average health are unacceptable. It is crucial to note, however, that a framework of fair distribution should acknowledge that weak equality is not the only concern. As noted by Sen, equality is not only a complex notion where there is "internal plurality" within the concept itself. Equality can only be properly understood if it is considered together with other key ethical concepts:
"The demands of equality cannot be clearly interpreted or understood without taking adequate note of efficiency considerations. The point is not merely that the demands of equality have to be ultimately weighted against the force of competing demands, when present. It is also that the interpretation of the demands that equality makes has to be assessed in the light of other considerations (e.g. aggregative concerns) that are inter alia recognized. The explicit admittance of other concerns avoids the overburdening of equality with unnecessary loads." [16]
Trade-off questions are important in the context of population-level policies, where the aim is to distribute healthy life years fairly. For example, how much equality of healthy life years between different groups or individuals is a decision-maker is willing to sacrifice, in order to move towards a higher average for all? Or, following Anand: 'what amount of healthy life years, if enjoyed equally by everybody, would have equivalent value to a greater average healthy life expectancy?' [14, 53]. Equal health here refers to equality in health that is amenable to positive human intervention.
When are inequalities in health unfair? Answers to this question may be useful for people who want to measure inequalities in health. A definition of health equity may also be useful to people who are concerned about priority setting in health and health care.
When making national coverage decisions under 1862(a)(1)(A), CMS generally evaluates relevant clinical evidence to determine whether or not the evidence is of sufficient quality to support a finding that an item or service falling within a benefit category is reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body member. The critical appraisal of the evidence enables us to determine to what degree we are confident that: 1) the specific assessment questions can be answered conclusively; and 2) the intervention will improve health outcomes for patients. An improved health outcome is one of several considerations in determining whether an item or service is reasonable and necessary.
Although CMS proposed CED and we continue to believe that methodologically rigorous clinical trials would address important questions, we also understand that LSG is not commonly considered for older patients, which is reflected in the lack of older subjects in the reported clinical studies. New evidence could support the broader identification of patients who would be more likely to benefit from LSG and might permit us to make a more general positive national coverage determination in the future. New evidence on the long term benefit of LSG would assist patients and their treating physicians who make choices from the available bariatric surgery options. 2ff7e9595c
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